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Research performance plays an increasingly important role in funding research projects and in-
stitutions, as well as promoting individual researchers. Understanding what drives a researcher￿ s
productivity is of interest to policy makers and to governors of research organizations as it allows
for more informed decisions regarding the design of science systems and career paths.
Scienti￿c research unraveling the determinants of research productivity has not been abundant,
but is gradually receiving more attention, both at the level of the individual researcher and at
more aggregate levels (see for example Stephan & Levin (1992) and Stephan (1996) for a survey).
Despite indications of substantial heterogeneity in the researcher population, dating back to Lotka
(1926), almost all empirical studies tend to explain average productivity only.
This paper starts from the skewness of the research productivity distribution. Using a panel
of individual researchers across biomedical and exact sciences at the KULeuven, we estimate the
impact of a range of productivity drivers at the separate quantiles of the productivity distribution,
looking at both quantity (publications) and quality (citations) of research output. Our approach
allows to examine whether determinants, like the often observed ￿ gender￿or ￿ access to funding￿
e⁄ects, operate consistently along the whole distribution versus at the lower or upper tail only.
Being able to characterize the e⁄ects across the whole distribution is important for an adequate
design of policy trying to a⁄ect these drivers.
To allow for the estimation of the conditional quantiles of integer counts of publications and
citations, we employ recent advances in the literature that extend the quantile regression approach
to count data (Machado & Santos Silva, 2005)). In addition, we control for unobserved heterogeneity
of researchers by estimating a correlated random-e⁄ects quantile model (Chamberlain,1984).
We ￿nd that the e⁄ect of most regressors di⁄ers signi￿cantly at di⁄erent points in the distri-
bution, yielding strong support for our quantile regression approach. This conclusion holds for
both the quantity and quality distribution. In addition, observables like funding, teaching load,
gender and entry cohort have a di⁄erent impact on the quantity distribution than on the quality
distribution. For example, the impact of small research grants on research quality remains roughly
constant across the distribution while the impact of this funding on research quantity is the highest
1at the bottom end of the distribution and then decreases monotonously towards the upper end.
This ￿nding would imply that an extreme selectivity in the assignment of research funds based on
the argument that the researchers who were the most productive in the past ￿ give the most bang for
the buck￿may be misdirected. Although one must be cautious generalizing the results found here,
the analysis makes the case for understanding the full productivity distribution, moving beyond an
analysis of averages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We start by situating our research in the
literature. In section 3 we discuss the data, providing details on the key aspects that we wish
to address. The next section details the quantile regression approach discussing the correlated
random e⁄ects model and the necessary adjustment to estimate conditional quantiles for count
data. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. The ￿nal section summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature review and research design
Most existing empirical studies on academic productivity concentrate on the e⁄ects of characteristics
of the individual researcher. These studies (for a review, see Stephan (1996)) have indicated the
importance of characteristics like age, with publishing activity initially increasing and then declining
in mid-career. Several studies have found that female scientists publish at lower rates than male
scientists. They also show the importance of controlling for scienti￿c discipline ideosyncracies. In
view of the signi￿cance of team e⁄ort in science, it is also important to assess collective e⁄ects
on individual productivity. Mairesse and Turner (2002) provide evidence that the quality of other
researchers belonging to the laboratory is a crucial variable for explaining individual productivity.
Most of the previous studies to date aim at explaining how individual and institutional charac-
teristics a⁄ect average productivity, ignoring the often skewed distribution of research productivity,
with many researchers non-active and a few researchers accounting for the bulk of the publications.
This skewed nature of the distribution of research output has nevertheless been widely documented
and characterized in the bibliometric literature. A recent exception of economic research on research
productivity analyzing more than just the conditional mean is the paper by Rauber & Ursprung
(2006). Using data on German economists, they model a continuous measure of research output as
2a function of career age, cohort, gender and economic subdiscipline. As one part of their analysis,
they use a cross-sectional quantile estimator to study the upper part of the productivity distribution
(75th - 95th quantile). For each of the investigated quantiles, they ￿nd a life cycle e⁄ect.
This paper contributes to the economics of science literature on research productivity by es-
timating the impact of a large set of productivity determinants on both quantity and quality
dimensions of research performance and this for the whole productivity distribution, using recent
advances in quantile regression techniques. First, the data set allows controlling for a rich set of
determining factors, such as gender, tenure, rank, hierarchical position (head of team) and senior-
ity. Furthermore, the record of each researcher contains teaching load, administrative duties and
awards of additional research funding. Second, the set covers all biomedical and exact scientists at
the KU Leuven, allowing to check the in￿ uence of scienti￿c discipline e⁄ects; Third, using publica-
tions as well as citations information, we look at both quantity and quality dimensions of research
performance. We employ recent advances in quantile regression that allow its application to count
data. Fourth, since the data set is a panel comprising ten years of publication data 1992-2001, we
can separate age and cohort e⁄ects.
The panel nature of our dataset also allows estimating a random-e⁄ects model, which better
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity of researchers. Unobserved heterogeneity among researchers
makes it di¢ cult to pin down the impact of several variables on research output. Using Cham-
berlain￿ s correlated random e⁄ects model (1982, 1984), we control for unobserved heterogeneity in
the quantile estimations by allowing the researcher random e⁄ect to be related to observed char-
acteristics . For example, whether a researcher carries a high teaching load or not, is likely to
be correlated with unobserved characteristics such as a high a¢ nity for teaching. By explicitly
modeling the random e⁄ect as a function of teaching load (and other variables), we are better able
to identify the causal e⁄ect of teaching load on research output.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst e⁄ort to analyze research performance using quantile
regressions for panel and count data. The results support our approach. First, they show the
e⁄ects of determinants of research performance to di⁄er across quantiles. Second, they indicate
the di⁄erential impact of determinants across the productivity distribution to play di⁄erently for
quantity versus quality dimensions of research performance. Furthermore, a formal test of the
3correlated random e⁄ects model clearly rejects a pure random e⁄ects approach where the random
e⁄ects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the observables.
3 The data
We constructed a unique panel of 1,036 scientists within the ￿elds of biomedical and exact sci-
ences, in the period 1992-2001, employed at the KU Leuven. Having only information on one
institution restricts the analysis with respect to institutional characteristics. It however allows ac-
cessing detailed institutional records, generating information on a wider set of individual researcher
characteristics.
The KU Leuven, the largest and oldest university in Belgium, represents the case of a research
university that has the ambition to establish a top position in research in ￿ poles of excellence￿ , and
have a good research performance in the other areas1. To this end it allocates research funding to
research proposals on the basis of (international) peer review of excellence in research. Recruitment
and promotion decisions also carry a strong research quality requirement. In addition, research out-
put (publications and citations) of its entire academic sta⁄ is regularly assessed since a substantial
part of university public funding is allocated on the basis of these indicators.
Combining information from the personnel administration of the KU Leuven with bibliomet-
ric data, we were able to include a rich set of variables to assess research performance and its
determinants. The dataset contains the following information:
￿ Scienti￿c output (per researcher per year) i.e. publications and citations in ISI journals
classi￿ed by scienti￿c discipline2;
￿ Organizational membership at the group (exact versus biomedical sciences), faculty (e.g.
medicine) and department (e.g. microbiology and immunology) level;
1For background on institutional features of the KU Leuven, see Appendix 2.
2The publication and citation counts were supplied by the Centre for R&D Statistics in Leuven, using ISI-data.
Citations are counted using a three-year forward citation window. There is also scienti￿c output that does not fall
under the scope of the Science Citation Index of the ISI. For instance, the ISI database does not include proceedings,
which in some disciplines, like engineering, are an important publication outlet. We refer to the appendix of a
companion paper (Kelchtermans & Veugelers, 2005) for details on the construction of the database.
4￿ Individual and career-related variables (per researcher per year) i.e. gender, age, cohort (year
of entry at KU Leuven), career age, rank (assistant professor, associate professor, professor
and full professor), seniority in rank, full-time versus part time position;
￿ Involvement as a promoter or copromoter of research projects awarded on a competitive basis.
Two major types of funding can be identi￿ed: the larger Type I (excellence) and the smaller
Type II funding. See Appendix 2 for a description of the KU Leuven research strategy and
the type of funding it awards.
￿ Other information relevant for examining scienti￿c performance, viz. actual teaching load,
other administrative duties within KU Leuven, being head of a research unit;
￿ Most researchers in the sample were not employed for the full 10 years: some of them retired
or left the university before 2001, others joined after 1992. These entries and exits yield an
unbalanced panel and allow examining cohort e⁄ects. The data set holds on average 778
researchers per year. We restricted the dataset to researchers whom we observe for at least 2
periods.
On average a researcher in our dataset publishes 3.3 articles. A publication gets on average 3
citations per year and has an average impact factor of 3.2. But this average has a high standard
deviation (resp 5.1 for publications and 4.2 for citations). The Lorenz curves in Figure 1 con￿rm
the skewed distribution of research quantity (publications). For research quality (citations) the
pattern is even more skewed. In the remainder of the analysis, in order to avoid overload of results,
we will focus the discussion on publications, reporting results for citations only when they reveal
interesting di⁄erences with publications (see section 5.3)3.
The propensity to publish varies greatly among disciplines. Table 4 shows the quantiles of the
publication distribution by main discipline of the researcher4. These quantiles are obtained by
3The correlation coe¢ cient for publications and citations in our dataset is 0.77.
4Table 1 and table 2 present the distribution of scientists over the respective faculties and disciplines. Within the
group of Exact Sciences, the faculty of Science (192 professors) and the one of Engineering (214) are the largest. In
the group of Biomedical Sciences, the faculty of Medicine (460 professors) clearly dominates in terms of size.
5comparing the yearly publication output of all researchers who share the same main discipline5
and are then averaged across years. The characterization of the publication distribution in this
table includes the output of the 814 researchers for whom we observe at least one publication in
1992-20016. Although the 222 researchers with a persistently blank publication record are ignored
here7;8, note that the prevalence of (non-persistent) zeroes is still very high, as can be observed by
the small (di⁄erences in) percentile values at the bottom of the distribution. For most disciplines,
in each year there is at least 10% of zero in￿ ation, so that the 10th percentile equals zero. For
engineering, zero in￿ ation even amounts to 25%. All this re￿ ects the importance of scienti￿c
discipline speci￿c e⁄ects when examining research productivity.
Table 5 reports averages for the individual and career-related characteristics of the researchers,
comparing the whole sample with the di⁄erent ￿ percentile bands￿of active researchers. Researchers
are assigned to a percentile band as follows. Their publication output in a particular year is
compared with the percentile values for their main discipline in that year9 i.e. the values for which
the yearly averages were reported in Table 4. Researchers are assigned to the highest percentile
band they qualify for10. Because a researcher￿ s output may vary across years, she may be part
of a di⁄erent percentile band in each year, although researchers tend to be very immobile in their
output levels (see Kelchtermans & Veugelers (2005), based on the same dataset).
In the whole sample about 89% of researchers are male. In line with previous studies on scienti￿c
5Formally, the 100￿th quantile of the publication distribution Y given x is given by QY (￿jx) =
minf￿jP (Y ￿ ￿jx) ￿ ￿g.
6Active researchers tend to publish in several of the 10 disciplines. A researcher￿ s main discipline is de￿ned as the
discipline in which she has published the most articles between 1992-2001. Consequently, inactive researchers i.e. for
whom we don￿ t observe any publications in 1992-2001, cannot be assigned a main discipline.
7All researchers, including the ￿ persistent zeroes￿ , are included in the empirical analysis later on.
8Inspection of the data reveals that we can attribute this apparent ￿ inactivity￿(at least partially) to the involvement
of sta⁄ as practitioners in their ￿eld of expertise. In other words, some sta⁄ members may have a full-time position at
the university but are nevertheless not expected to carry out research. In particular, there are four departments where
more than one third of full-time sta⁄ doesn￿ t show up in the ISI publication records. It concerns the departments of
architecture, public health (where general physicians are trained), sports & motion sciences and kinesiology.
9Note that this procedure, by comparing researchers with their peers in the same disicpline, controls for discipline-
speci￿c publication patterns and therefore avoids that researchers from disciplines characterized by lower publication
rates are all classi￿ed in the lower percentiles.
10For example, a researcher may publish enough articles in a given year to beat the 50
th percentile in her discipline
but not enough to reach the 75
th percentile: for that year, she is classi￿ed in the 50%-75% percentile band, and in
this band only. As mentioned, due to zero in￿ ation it is possible that both the 10
th and 25
th percentile equal zero. In
that case, researchers with zero publications are classi￿ed in the 10%-25% percentile band, leaving the <10% band
empty.
6productivity, we ￿nd that female researchers are underrepresented among the most productive
researchers. No clear age pattern emerges across the percentile bands. Also the distribution over
age cohorts at di⁄erent points in the distribution seems roughly consistent with the distribution in
the whole sample. Recent entry cohorts are overrepresented at the lower end of the distribution,
while the situation is reversed at the upper end. A similar pattern emerges with respect to a
rank. We distinguish between four main ranks, with rank 1 the entry level ("assistant professor")
and rank 4 the highest possible rank ("full professor"). The junior ranks are more prevalent in
the lower half of the distribution. For the upper half of conditional productivity distribution the
proportion of full-time researchers rises to higher than average. The average teaching load for a
professor increases monotonously with rank. But the averages by percentile band do not suggest
that teaching substitutes for research output, on the contrary. Finally, on average 9% of the sample
is involved in a type I project as a promoter or copromoter, while 11% (co-)promotes a type II
project. Involvement in these research projects varies strongly by percentile band.
4 Quantile regression framework
Section 4.1 speci￿es the correlated random-e⁄ects model (Chamberlain, 1984) allowing to control
for individual e⁄ects in a quantile model. Section 4.2 discusses the smoothing approach that allows
quantile regression for count data (Machado and Santos Silva, 2005).
4.1 Conditional quantiles of productivity with panel data
It has been argued before in the literature (e.g. Fox, 1983) that the reason why some scientists are
very proli￿c while others are not, may lie in the possession of a unique talent for research such as
motivation and creativity. These idiosyncratic but unobserved characteristics are captured by an
individual-speci￿c, time-independent e⁄ect. Di⁄erent assumptions for the unobserved individual
e⁄ect lead to di⁄erent ￿ avors of panel-data models. While the random e⁄ects model assumes
that this e⁄ect is uncorrelated with the vector of observed characteristics, an assumption which is
usually hard to maintain in empirical applications, the ￿xed e⁄ects model allows for correlation
but in an unspeci￿ed way. In a least squares framework, consistent estimates can be obtained
7by transforming the variables in deviations from individual means. This di⁄erencing approach is
however not available for quantile regressions since quantiles are not linear operators, a critical
requirement for this strategy to work (Koenker & Hallock, 2001; Koenker, 2004).
To account for unobserved individual e⁄ects in our quantile regression we use Chamberlain￿ s
correlated random-e⁄ects model (1984)11. In line with other research (e.g. Levin and Stephan, 1991)
we expect that the unobserved individual-speci￿c e⁄ect is correlated with some of the determinants
of research productivity. Chamberlain￿ s correlated random-e⁄ects model (1984) employs a random
e⁄ects speci￿cation that allows for such correlation.
A standard linear panel-data model for our data may be written as:
Yit = X0
it￿ + Z0
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. The unobserved indi-
vidual e⁄ect is denoted by ￿i and "it is the error term. Xit denotes the variables that are expected
to correlate with the individual e⁄ect as opposed to those included in Zit.
The correlated random e⁄ects estimator uses a linear speci￿cation for the unobservable ￿i
consisting of the observables Xit plus an additional error term ￿i:





where ￿ is a constant and ￿i is uncorrelated with Xit and T ￿ 1012.
11An alternative approach for estimating conditional quantiles accounting for individual e⁄ects is proposed by
Koenker (2004). It consists of adding a penalty term to the quantile objective function as a way to impose structure
on the ￿xed e⁄ects. While o⁄ering the advantage of leaving the relation between the ￿xed e⁄ect and the observables
unspeci￿ed, the choice of the ￿ tuning parameter￿that controls the degree of structure is an open research issue.
Recently, Lamarche (2006) has made progress in developing a selection mechanism for the value of this tuning
parameter that minimizes the estimated asymptotic variance, provided an additional assumption for the individual
e⁄ects distribution is made. In this paper, we adopt a di⁄erent approach.
12Since we have an unbalanced panel, the number of observation periods varies by individual i (we observe an
individual on average 7.5 years). To simplify notation, we write Ti = T. The estimates reported in section 5 use
T = 2. Higher values of T do not alter the results.
8Note that the correlated random-e⁄ects model can not take into account potential correlation
between time-invariant variables and the individual e⁄ect. Based on this correlated random-e⁄ects
model, the conditional quantile functions are written as linear functions of the observables. We
assume that the direct e⁄ects of the variables Xi and the e⁄ects of the variables Zi on the conditional
quantiles is constant across time.
For t = 1 the function for quantile ￿ can then be written as:








The conditional quantile functions for t 6= 1 are analogous to (1).
A simple estimation strategy for (1) is by a pooled quantile regression on the stacked data,
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The computation of the standard errors should account for the dependence between the re-
peated observations of a single researcher. This means that the standard formula to calculate the
asymptotic variance of the quantile estimators (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) cannot be applied. Fol-
lowing Abrevaya & Dahl (2005), we adopt a clustered bootstrapping procedure where the bootstrap
sample contains all observations of a researcher if that researcher is drawn to be included in the
bootstrap sample.
We test whether our approach of modeling the individual e⁄ect in terms of observables is valid.
The testing framework (following Buchinsky, 1998) is discussed in Appendix 1. The test results are
reported in section 5.1.
94.2 Quantile regression for count data
The main problem when estimating conditional quantiles for a count variable Y is that, because
it has a discrete distribution, Q￿ (Y jX;Z) is not a continuous function of the parameters. To be
able to apply quantile regression to count data, arti￿cial smoothness must be imposed. Machado
and Santos Silva (2005) suggest a ￿ jittering approach￿where the needed smoothness is achieved by
adding to the count variable Y a random variable U, leading to a new variable V = Y + U. U
is independent of Y , X and Z and uniformly distributed in the interval [0;1). The authors show
that it is possible to perform inferences about Q￿ (V jX;Z), the conditional quantile function of
the smoothed data. Further, they relate the quantiles of the random variables V and Y , which is
crucial since the ultimate interest lies in the quantile function of the original count data:




P (Y = yjX;Z)
P (Y = Q￿ (Y jX;Z)jX;Z)
(2)
Thus, a continuous distribution is achieved by interpolating the discrete jumps in the conditional
quantile function of the counts. Q￿ (V jX;Z) can be estimated using standard quantile regression
techniques13.
The conditional quantile function of V for t = 1 can be written as14:









with the conditional quantile functions for t 6= 1 analogous.
It is important to point out that this approach is particularly useful to analyze the lower end
of the research output distribution, given that it is characterized by zero in￿ ation. To see this, let
xk
it denote the k-th element from Xit and ￿k
￿ the k-th element from ￿￿. In a dataset with 100 ￿ ￿
percent of zero in￿ ation, all of the quantiles of Y up to ￿ = ￿ will be identically zero, ruling out
13In particular, several jittered samples are generated and used for estimation, after wich the estimates are averaged
to yield the ￿nal parameters
14Machado & Santos Silva (2005) impose an additional restriction on the quantile process of the smoothed variable
V by ￿rst applying a monotone transformation to V . The transformed V is then speci￿ed to be a linear function of
the regressors, rather than specifying V itself as a linear quantile function as in (3). For simplicity, we abstract from
this transformation in our exposition.
10any e⁄ects from the observables. Expression (2) shows15 that while it is possible for a change in
xk
it not to have an impact on a given quantile ￿ 0 of the count variable Y (￿k
￿ = 0), it may in￿ uence
the probability distribution at or below Q￿ (Y jX;Z). Therefore, it is easier to pick up dependence
of the distribution of Y on X and Z by looking at Q￿ (V jX;Z) than by looking at Q￿ (Y jX;Z).
Machado & Santos Silva (2005) refer to this as the "magnifying glass e⁄ect" of Q￿ (V jX;Z). As
it allows studying the lower part of the distribution, this approach is particularly useful for the
problem at hand, given the skewness of the productivity distribution for both publications and
citations, with many zero observations.
4.3 Variables
Our empirical analysis investigates the impact of a series of variables on di⁄erent quantiles of
productivity. The selection of factors determining research productivity are based on the ￿ndings
of previous research, as reviewed in section 2. As there is little guidance from previous research
results, we hypothesize e⁄ects to hold for both quantity and quality of research output, although
the size of the e⁄ects may be di⁄erent for both dimensions. We close the section with a discussion
of the di⁄erential impact of these variables along the productivity distribution, which is the main
focus of our analysis.
The determining variables are grouped depending on whether they are part of the random
e⁄ect speci￿cation or not (see section 4.1). The following characteristics are taken up as part of
the X-variable, i.e. they are part of the random e⁄ect speci￿cation, assumed to correlate with the
unobservable ￿xed e⁄ects:
￿ Rank. Researchers up for promotion are expected to have a higher motivation to provide
research e⁄ort. Thus, in lower ranks, researchers should have more incentives to put in e⁄ort
to get promotion. On the other hand, the higher ranks also have a strong incentive to put in
e⁄ort in order to "prove their rank". In addition, having a more advanced rank may in￿ uence
the way research is done. E.g. a full professor may have access to research assistants, may
have a more extensive research network as well as an established reputation that allows for
15The same argument holds for z
g
i1 as the g-th element from Zi1 and for ￿
g
￿ as the g-th element from ￿￿.
11a more steady stream of output compared to more junior professors. Note that since past
research output is taken into account when hiring and promoting, it is likely that current
performance will increase the probability of getting a higher rank. To take this endogeneity
(at least partly) into account, we lag the rank indicators by one period16.
￿ Seniority in rank. The variable seniority in rank should capture increasing pressure to provide
e⁄ort, the longer a researcher is in his current rank (since the more likely she is to be up for
promotion). We might expect a non-linearity: once a researcher is far beyond the expected
seniority (typically two years), this might re￿ ect a structurally reduced probability to get
promotion. Also, the more senior, the higher is the wage and thus the smaller is the incentive
from increasing wage with rank. Especially in the end rank (full professor) seniority in rank
looses its speci￿c function and will correlate with age.
￿ Head of a research unit. Heading a research lab may boost someone￿ s output by having
access to resources for research as well as being involved in more projects with the possibility
of claiming coauthorship. Conversely, a proli￿c researcher may ￿nd that such duties hamper
her from spending time on doing the actual research. Given that high performers are more
likely to become heads of unit, there is an issue of endogeneity, so we lag this variable by one
period.
￿ Project funding. Someone￿ s publication record is expected to bene￿t from having access to
additional research funds since they represent additional resources. Especially the Type I
funding involve serious amounts of research funding. Since research performance is typically
taken up as a criterion to judge research proposals, we lag this variable by one period.
￿ Number of coauthors. We include a researcher￿ s number of coauthors in every year in the model
16For researchers who became a professor before 1992 (the ￿rst period of observation of our data, which covers 1992-
2001) we observe the rank they had in 1991 so the one-period lagged rank variable can be assigned. For researchers
entering in or after 1992 we do not have information on their rank in the year prior to entry. For these researchers
we set the lagged rank variable in the ￿rst period of observation equal to "other rank", i.e. not one of the four main
ranks. We consider this a fair assumption since these would typically be junior faculty who were active as post-docs
before becoming a professor. Note that a missing value would completely remove those individuals from the dataset:
due to the set-up of the correlated random-e⁄ects model, where all lagged rank variables enter the individual￿ s yearly
output function, a missing value for one of them would show up in every year, e⁄ectively removing the individual
from the panel. An analogous comment applies to the de￿nition of the lagged variables for funding and for "head of
unit"-status.
12as a way to capture a researcher￿ s collaborative style. Scientists that cooperate intensely with
colleagues are expected to be more proli￿c than their peers who work in more solitary manner.
￿ Teaching load. The inclusion of actual teaching load should be able to correct for the lost time
for research when having to teach students. Therefore, we expect a negative impact of teaching
load on research output. Due to self-selection of professors with an unobserved preference
for teaching vis-￿-vis research, controlling for such unobserved individual heterogeneity may
reduce the e⁄ect.
For each of the variables in the random e⁄ects speci￿cation (rank, seniority in rank, head of
unit, project funding, number of coauthors and teaching load), we can separate the direct e⁄ect ￿
on the ￿-th conditional quantile of research output from the indirect e⁄ects ￿ working through the
unobservable ￿i.
The following characteristics are taken up as part of the Z-variable, representing the variables
uncorrelated with ￿i. Zit includes both time-invariant as well as time varying variables:
￿ Gender. Previous research has repeatedly identi￿ed a productivity gap in the favor of male
researchers.
￿ Age and career age. A higher (biological) age may be bene￿cial for performance, given that
it takes time and experience to build an advantage, although we expect a decreasing e⁄ect
with time. We also include seniority as professor (frequently referred to as career age). This
variable might be important beyond the seniority in rank in terms of the incentive to provide
e⁄ort, since wages received by professors in Belgium are not only determined by rank, but
also, and strongly, by seniority as professor.
￿ Entry cohort. To disentangle age from cohort e⁄ects, we also include dummies for entry into
the sample. The most important cohort e⁄ect seems to be a marked increase in hiring by the
KU Leuven in 199217, for which we include a dummy variable.
17This peak in hiring corresponds mainly to a growing number of retiring faculty that needed to be replaced.
13￿ Time. Apart from entry cohort e⁄ects, we include calendar year dummies in our model to
control for trends such as increased publication pressure.
￿ Discipline. All existing studies indicate the importance of controlling for scienti￿c discipline
idiosyncrasies.
￿ Faculty membership. This allows capturing the in￿ uence of organizational structure and
strategy to promote and provide incentives for research, to the extent that these units are
responsible for developing a good research environment. It also allows correcting for the
impact of spillovers from the quality or prestige of the group to which the researcher belongs.
￿ Full-time versus part-time. Whether a professor holds a full-time position at the university
has obvious implications for available research time and more generally captures whether a
professor is expected to do any research at all. Part time appointments, mostly occurring at
the engineering faculty in our sample, are typically for people from industry who are hired
and evaluated on teaching rather than research.
With respect to the impact of the determining variables at di⁄erent points in the productivity
distribution, there is little existing scienti￿c knowledge we can bring on board to formulate hypothe-
ses. We expect for all of the observed characteristics mentioned above that they have a smaller
impact at the top of the distribution than at the bottom. We hypothesize that the individual e⁄ect
primarily captures the researcher￿ s talent and that this is the predominant ￿ key success factor￿in
the upper tail of the productivity distribution, driving star performance, where it dwarfs the e⁄ect
of other variables like age, gender, funding, teaching load, etc. Conversely, these observed char-
acteristics are expected to manifest themselves more clearly at the bottom end of the distribution
where the endowments and therefore the impact of research talent may be expected to be more
modest, as compared to other factors. In addition, the power of incentives may decrease at the
top. Variables like research funding may no longer act as high-powered incentives for researchers
situated at the top of the distribution. For an established star scientist yet another research grant
is unlikely to represent a major impulse to increase her output even further.
145 Empirical results
We ￿rst discuss in section 5.1 the results of various tests on model speci￿cations, before we discuss
the main results on drivers for research performance across quantiles. First the results on research
quantity (publications) are reported (section 5.2). Comparisons with results for research quality
(citations) are reported in section 5.3. Section 5.4 closes with a discussion on which e⁄ects di⁄er
signi￿cantly across the distribution of research performance (publications and citations), further
supporting our quantile approach as compared to a typical means analysis.
5.1 Results on model tests
The panel-data results are reported18 in table 7, following the speci￿cation as expressed in (1).
Estimates for ￿ve quantiles are shown19 together with the results of a random e⁄ects negative
binomial model explaining average publication output. In the random e⁄ects negative binomial
model the dispersion varies randomly across researchers such that the inverse of one plus the
dispersion follows a Beta(r,s) distribution. Both r and s are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. A
likelihood ratio test that compares the negative binomial panel estimator with the pooled estimator
(i.e. the negative binomial estimator with a constant dispersion across researchers), strongly favors
the panel estimator.
The unobserved heterogeneity parameters ￿t are not reported. The estimates are available from
the authors on request. We tested their joint signi￿cance in order to check whether our approach
of modelling the individual e⁄ect in terms of observables is valid (see Appendix 1 for a discussion
of the testing framework). The null hypothesis states that the ￿ parameters are jointly equal
to zero, H0 : ￿1
￿ = ::: = ￿T
￿ = 0, simultaneously for all ￿ with ￿ 2 f0:10;0:25;0:50;0:75;0:90g.
The null hypothesis is strongly rejected with a p-value very close to zero. The formal test of the
correlated random e⁄ects model therefore clearly prefers this speci￿cation over the cross-sectional
speci￿cation (reported in table 6 for reference). For the variables that are taken up in the random
18The parameters reported here are based on 400 bootstraps and 10 jittered samples for each quantile, accounting
for 400x5x10=20,000 regressions. A robustness check using 50 jittered samples for each quantile (instead of 10) shows
that the point estimates are very robust.
19Our choice of quantiles follows the one commonly made in the ￿eld of quantile regression. Of course, choosing
other quantiles would lead to di⁄erent parameter estimates. However, we do not expect this to alter our conclusions.
15e⁄ect speci￿cation (see section 4.3), we will thus be able to distinguish between their true e⁄ect
and the part that is correlated with the (unobserved) individual e⁄ect of the researcher.
5.2 Cross section and panel data results on publications
In this section we discuss the parameter estimates, emphasizing the panel data results. To allow
for an easy comparison of the cross-section and panel-data results, we show the quantile estimates
for a selection of parameters from Tables 6 and 7 in Figure 2. The solid line indicates the point
estimates for the ￿ve quantiles of the panel-data model with the dashed lines marking the 95%
con￿dence interval. The dotted line are the cross-sectional estimates.
￿ Age. Support for an age e⁄ect is very limited. We ￿nd a small positive e⁄ect in the 90%
quantile in both the cross-sectional and panel estimates. The positive age e⁄ect at the 10%
quantile for the cross-sectional model is not con￿rmed in the panel-data results.
￿ Career age. The models o⁄er little or no evidence for any in￿ uence of career age: the mar-
ginally signi￿cant and negative e⁄ect in the lower quantiles of the cross-sectional model is not
robust in the panel-data results.
￿ Seniority in rank. The panel estimates show a signi￿cant negative in￿ uence on publication
output with a decreasing e⁄ect higher up in the distribution, which disappears at the very
top in the 90% quantile. Seniority in rank has no e⁄ect in the cross-sectional speci￿cation.
￿ Rank. The three junior ranks are less productive than the most senior rank (full professor, the
base category) with the productivity di⁄erential decreasing with rank. The di⁄erence between
ranks is less outspoken in the panel-data model than in the cross-sectional model, especially
between rank 3 (professor) and the most senior rank (full professor, the base category).
Further, in both models the productivity di⁄erential between ranks becomes smaller the
higher up we look in the distribution.
￿ Head of a research unit. Heading a research unit has a positive impact on publication output
but in the cross-sectional model the e⁄ect disappears for the upper half of the distribution.
16In the panel model, the e⁄ect remains present throughout the whole distribution, although it
is clearly smaller in the 75% and 90% quantiles.
￿ Project funding. Having access to project funding is positively related to research output, as
expected. However, for the big type I funding it is mainly the lower quantiles that bene￿t.
Similarly, the more modest type II research grants boost the output in the lower quantiles
but this type of funding also makes the very proli￿c researchers even more productive. The
e⁄ects of funding are comparable in both models.
￿ Number of coauthors. The number of coauthors shows up as an signi￿cant control variable in
both models, with a positive e⁄ect on output, although the magnitude is small.
￿ Teaching load. The cross-sectional estimates show a small but signi￿cant negative impact on
output, mainly for the lower quantiles. The panel data model shows a di⁄erent picture: here
we ￿nd a negative, albeit small, impact only at the top of the distribution (75% and 90%
quantile). We attribute this di⁄erence to unobserved heterogeneity, with professors having
an a¢ nity for teaching likely to engage more in such activities.
￿ Gender. There is evidence of a gender e⁄ect with male researchers more productive than
their female colleagues. It is interesting to see the irregularity of the gender e⁄ect along
the distribution: while absent for the 10% quantile, it is strongest for the moderately active
researchers (25% quantile) and then decreases gradually for the higher quantiles, but remains
signi￿cant up to the very top of the distribution (90% quantile). The gender e⁄ect in the
panel-data model is very robust compared to the one in the cross-sectional model, as expected,
since we did not endogenize this variable.
￿ Full-time versus part-time. The control for being full-time at the university is very signi￿cant,
as expected. For both models, the highest value appears in the 10% quantile, which con￿rms
the intuition that being full-time primarily explains whether a researcher is engaged in research
at all.
￿ Entry cohort. Being part of the cohort that entered professorship in or after 1992 has a
negative impact on publication output but only for moderately productive researchers (25%
17and 50% quantile in the panel-data results). The cross-sectional model o⁄ers no support for
an entry cohort e⁄ect.
￿ Time (not reported in the table). The dummies for calendar year, which may capture general
trends like increased publication pressure, show a small and positive e⁄ect for the later years
in the cross-sectional model. In the panel model they show a clear pattern, suggesting an
increasing publication trend with the higher quantiles responding quicker than the lower
quantiles: the 90% quantile shows a clearly signi￿cant positive coe¢ cient from 1995 onwards
(parameter value of 0.12 in 1995) with some of the lower quantiles joining in 199720.
￿ Discipline and faculty membership (not reported in the table). Controlling for discipline and
organizational unit is important, with similar estimates in both models21.
5.3 Results for citations compared to publications
Table 8 shows the panel-data results for citations for ￿ve quantiles, with the results of a random
e⁄ects negative binomial model explaining average citation output22. Since research quantity tends
to correlate with research quality, we do not expect strong di⁄erences with the results in the
previous section23. Rather, we look for di⁄erences in the importance of productivity drivers along
the distribution. The discussion ￿rst details common ￿ndings, before tackling the di⁄erences in
results for quality and quantity.
The common ￿ndings for both productivity measures include:
￿ There is no (biological) age e⁄ect, nor a life cycle e⁄ect (career age).
￿ The negative e⁄ect of rank seniority decreases from lower to higher quantiles. At the top of
the distribution the e⁄ect on publications or citations is no longer signi￿cant.
20The magnitude of the e⁄ect tends to be greater for the lower quantiles than for the 90% quantile: we ￿nd,
for example, parameter values of 0.99 and 0.66 for the 10% and 25% quantile respectively, versus 0.21 for the 90%
quantile in 1999, all relative to 1992 as the base year. All these estimates are signi￿cant at the 5% level.
21The e⁄ect of discipline across quantiles depends on the discipline considered. For example, the productivity
di⁄erence with the faculty of kinesiology & physical education (the base category) increases with quantile for the
faculty of agriculture, while it decreases with quantile for the faculty of pharmacy.
22A likelihood ratio test that compares the negative binomial panel estimator with the pooled estimator (i.e. the
negative binomial estimator with a constant dispersion across researchers), strongly favors the panel data estimator.
23When comparing quantity and quality results, we focus on signs and signi￿cance of e⁄ects.
18￿ The productivity di⁄erence between the three junior ranks and the full professor rank (in the
favor of the latter) decreases from lower to higher rank and from lower to higher quantiles.
For both the quantity and the quality model, the panel estimates are smaller than the cross-
sectional estimates.
￿ There is a positive and decreasing e⁄ect of heading a research lab. At the top of the distrib-
ution the impact on publications or citations is no longer or only marginally signi￿cant.
￿ The positive e⁄ect of Type I ￿ excellence￿funding decreases from lower to higher quantiles.
￿ The positive e⁄ect of the number of coauthors increases from lower to higher quantiles.
￿ The positive e⁄ect on productivity of gender, in favor of male researchers, is found for both
the quantity and the quality model, where in both cases it remains absent for the extreme
left side of the distribution (10% quantile).
￿ The positive e⁄ect of being employed full-time at the university decreases from lower to higher
quantiles.
￿ There is a positive time trend.
￿ The e⁄ects of scienti￿c discipline and organizational unit membership across quantiles are
similar for publications and citations.
Noteworthy di⁄erences between the quantity and quality panel data estimation results are:
￿ The positive e⁄ect of Type II funding remains roughly constant from lower to higher quantiles
of research quality while it is decreasing with quantile for research quantity. This indicates
that small chunks of additional funding represent an upward shift in quality for researchers
throughout the distribution, irrespective of their research talent. The reason why this constant
upward shift does not hold for Type I funding may be due to the nature of this funding: while
Type II funds are more modest research grants most likely used by the researcher herself (to
attend conferences, buy software, etc.), the large Type I funds are awarded to large group of
19researchers and the impact on the personal output of the project￿ s (co-)promoter may be less
pronounced.
￿ For the quality distribution, we ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of teaching load located at the lower
end (10% and 25% quantile) and the top end (90% quantile), with the lower end ￿ su⁄ering￿
more from teaching duties. For the quantity distribution there is a very small negative e⁄ect
at the top end only. This may indicate that teaching duties do not prohibit research as such,
but rather that unproductive (or less able) researchers may have di¢ culties keeping up the
quality of their research when facing time constraints.
￿ The e⁄ect of entry cohort di⁄ers: for both quantity and quality, we ￿nd a negative e⁄ect
of being part of the most recent entry cohort, but only for the 25%-50% quantile (quantity)
and the 25% quantile (quality). For research quality, there is an additional point in the
distribution that shows a positive e⁄ect of the most recent entry cohort, namely at the very
top of the distribution. This may again point to the role of ability: while the very able and
recently entered researchers are able to deliver a quality surplus relative to older cohorts,
they do not publish more than their more experienced colleagues. Conversely, those recent
entrants with more modest research talent endowments (in the midst or lower half of the
distribution) apparently face a disadvantage relative to their more experienced colleagues,
which is translated into fewer publications, usually of lesser quality. In this part of the
distribution, the smaller stock of research knowledge (or perhaps the lesser experience with
the research process) for the younger cohort may not be compensated for by research talent.
5.4 Results for di⁄erences across quantiles
Finally, we formally test whether a certain variable has a di⁄erential e⁄ect across quantiles, inform-
ing us whether looking at quantiles really gives us additional information compared to regressions
on the mean. For example, we test whether the gender e⁄ect has an equal e⁄ect across the ￿ve





￿=0:90. The test results
for the cross-sectional and the panel-data speci￿cation are reported in Table 9, for both quantity
and quality of output. We report the ￿2-values and indicate the signi￿cance. These tests yield
20strong evidence that for most parameters the estimates vary over the ￿ve quantiles. The only
exceptions are found in the publications model for the parameters of age (cross-section and panel),
teaching load (panel) and entry cohort (cross-section). Naturally, pairwise comparisons of quantiles
would show fewer signi￿cant di⁄erences than comparing the estimates of a given parameter across
all quantiles24, but overall we consider this as strong support for a quantile regression approach,
compared to an analysis of mean productivity only.
6 Conclusions and further research
This paper has estimated the impact of various productivity drivers along the productivity dis-
tribution, both in terms of quantity and quality. To account for unobserved heterogeneity in the
estimation of the conditional quantiles, we used a correlated random e⁄ects model, exploiting the
panel nature of our dataset. We subjected the integer counts of publications and citations to a
randomization approach to allow for quantile estimation.
We found strong support for our quantile regression approach vis-￿-vis regressions on the con-
ditional mean only, as indicated by the di⁄erential impact of most variables along the distribution.
More speci￿cally, we ￿nd support for the hypothesis that the top of the distribution is mainly driven
by talent (or a loss of incentive power of factors like promotion or research grants), as opposed to
the lower end where the impact of these characteristics is more visible. The evidence is provided
by the stronger impact of several observed variables (like rank, seniority in rank, head of unit, big
research grants) on the lower quantiles versus a weaker (or even insigni￿cant) e⁄ect on the higher
quantiles. Also the gender e⁄ect displays di⁄erent e⁄ects along the productivity distribution. While
the gender e⁄ect diminishes when moving towards the top end of the distribution, it does not play
any role at the extreme lower of the distribution.
As far as the comparison between the analyses for research quantity and research quality is
concerned, we found several observed factors to have a very similar e⁄ect, viz. age & career age
(no e⁄ect), rank & rank seniority, excellence funding, head of unit, and the control variables (co-
authors, fulltime position, discipline, time, faculty membership). Given the correlation between
24As noted above, we ackowledge that the choice of quantiles is somewhat arbitrary, and a di⁄erent selection of
quantiles may yield di⁄erent results, but we do not expect this to have a substantial impact on our results.
21quantity and quality of research, this strengthens our con￿dence in the ￿ndings. The e⁄ects of
small research funds, teaching load and entry cohort show a di⁄erent pattern across the quantity
versus quality distribution.
Although we caution against generalizations based on this study of a single university, we believe
our ￿ndings are informative with respect to the management of scientists in research organizations.
In particular, the results may be informative for university governors who are implementing in-
centive programs or make funding decisions. For example, our estimates indicate that a reduced
teaching load for not very productive researchers in an attempt to ￿ pull them on board￿may not
lead to the expected increase in publications.
With respect to funding, the results indicate that funding tends to reduce output inequality
between researchers: the positive e⁄ect of funding is generally larger for the lower quantiles than is
observed at the top of the distribution. One must be careful not to interpret this as meaning that
the less productive researchers are more apt in converting additional funding into publications or
citations than more proli￿c researchers25: the estimates are conditional on the actual distribution
of research funds. As the data show, this distribution is inegalitarian with the top scientists
getting most of the funding, so there likely is an issue of diminishing returns. Nevertheless, the
results show that research money ￿ owing to the lower half of the distribution may be well spent,
cautioning against an extreme selectivity in awarding research funds.
7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix 1: Hypothesis testing
We tested the correlated random e⁄ects speci￿cation as well as the di⁄erence between parameters
across quantiles. This appendix discusses the minimum-distance framework of Buchinsky (1998)
as well as the restriction matrices used for testing.
25In addition, a full evaluation of funding decisions on productivity should take into account their impact on all
researchers who belong to the funded research group, and not only on the (co-)promoters of the projects, as in the
regressions presented here.
227.1.1 Minimum-distance testing framework
Let r denote the number of quantiles we estimate: ￿1;:::;￿r. For a given quantile ￿, the parameter
vectors ￿￿; ￿t
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￿0 where ￿ has dimension
r(K+ L+G+1)￿1. Let b ￿ denote the estimator of ￿ and b A the estimated variance-covariance matrix
of b ￿, obtained via bootstrapping. This matrix allow us to test hypotheses involving parameters from
di⁄erent quantiles.
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where R is the restriction matrix, the precise form of which depends on the hypothesis under
consideration. The detailed speci￿cation of the restriction matrix R for the tests in the following
sections is given below. Since we only consider linear restrictions, b ￿
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The null hypothesis is formulated as H0 : ￿ = R￿R. Under H0, the following test statistic has
a limiting chi-squared distribution:
￿










with M the number of restrictions i.e. M = rows(R) ￿ columns(R).
7.1.2 Restriction matrices for hypothesis testing
Here we give the detailed speci￿cation of the restriction matrix R used for testing the hypotheses.
Test of correlated random e⁄ects
23Test of H0 : ￿1
￿ = ::: = ￿T
￿ = 0; 8￿.






























with I the identity matrix, O
a matrix of zeroes and ￿ the Kronecker product, so that M = rL.
Test of equality of individual parameters across quantiles



















i a matrix of ones26, so that M = r ￿ 1.
7.2 Appendix 2. The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Founded in 1425, the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KU Leuven) is the oldest and largest uni-
versity in Flanders and Belgium, encompassing all academic disciplines. About 1,400 tenured
professors and more than 3,500 researchers are currently employed at KU Leuven, which has a
student population of more than 30,000 students each year.
It has the legal status of a private institution, but receives most of its funding from the Belgian
Government, both in a direct and in an indirect, competitive way. The basic public funding of the
university, that pays for the salaries of the academic personnel, has remained roughly stable in the
last decade, which has resulted in a more or less stable total number of professors at KU Leuven.
The funding for research on the other hand has increased continuously. Most of this funding is
obtained on a competitive basis: about one quarter is private funding from industry, about half
comes from project funding from national, regional and EU governments and about one quarter is
from the regional government allocated to the KU Leuven based on its share of regional publications,
citations and PhDs. The latter funding is redistributed within the KU Leuven on a competitive
26This de￿nition of R requires that the r parameters to be tested (one from each quantile) are the ￿rst r elements
in ￿. Therefore, ￿ is resorted prior to calculating the test statistic.
24basis. We have data on two major types of projects. ￿ Type I￿projects27 are intended to support
research groups from all disciplines with demonstrated scienti￿c value based on international peer
reviews, publications and other indicators of scienti￿c quality. Type I projects typically receive
funding of around 900,000 Euros for a total duration of ￿ve years (up to 1,625,000 Euros if several
research groups are involved). ￿ Type II￿projects28 are somewhat more modest in set-up and are
intended to stimulate potential for fundamental research. They can be awarded to individual
researchers as well as research groups with a good track record in research or with the intention to
start up a new line of research aiming at high quality output. Type II projects receive a maximum
funding of 475,000 Euros for a total duration of four years. Both types of funding are allocated
on the basis of competitive, external peer review evaluation of past team performance and project
proposal. Of the pre-screened proposals that are allowed to pass the full procedure, less than 50%
obtain funding.
The KU Leuven has as mission statement in the observed period to be among the top 25 Euro-
pean research universities in a wide number of scienti￿c disciplines. But it aims to be among the top
particularly in those disciplines in which it is already strong: biochemistry, biosciences, biomedical
and several disciplines in medicine, among which are hematology, oncology and cardiology.
In terms of career structure, we distinguish between four main ranks, with rank 1 the entry
level (￿ assistant professor￿ ) and rank 4 the highest possible rank (￿ full professor￿ ). KU Leuven o⁄ers
tenure to assistant professors who successfully pass the judgment of their work in the years following
their hiring. After this initial tenure decision, for which young professors are primarily evaluated
on their research output as opposed to other activities, they can be promoted in successive ranks
up to full professor based on their research and teaching performance, as well as duties performed
within the university, with the latter typically gaining importance as one progresses through the
ranks. While rank 2-4 have tenure, rank 1 are the untenured researchers. The power of the tenure
decision is however limited, since in its still recent history of tenure track, the KUL has no or little
records of not granting tenure.
27The actual name of these funds is ￿ GOA￿(Geconcerteerde Onderzoeksactie). We use the generic indication ￿ Type
I￿in the paper.
28The actual name of these funds is ￿ OT￿(Onderzoekstoelage). We use the generic indication ￿ Type II￿in the
paper.
25While o¢ cially the faculty as organizational unit is mostly responsible for the teaching programs,
and the department is the organizational unit for research activities, in practice both hierarchical
levels are intertwined, particularly with respect to recruiting and promotion of researchers. The
faculty level has a higher hierarchical position, with the dean being a member of the bureau that
decides on recruitment and promotion, on the basis of advice from the departments.
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28Table 1: Distribution of researchers over organizational units
Organizational Unit Freq. Percent
Group Exact Sciences 483 46.9
Faculty of Science 192 18.6
Faculty of Engineering 214 20.8
Faculty of Applied Bioscience and Engineering 77 7.5
Group Biomedical Sciences 547 53.1
Faculty of Medicine 460 44.7
Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences 36 3.5
Faculty of Physical Education & Kinesiology 51 5.0
Total 1030
￿ 100.0
￿ Six people switched between groups and/or faculties in the
period 1992-2001 and are not shown in this table.
Table 2: Distribution of researchers over disciplines
Main Discipline Freq. Percent
None (inactive researchers) 222 21.5
Clinical and Experimental Medicine II (Non-internal Medicine Specialties) 190 18.4
Clinical and Experimental Medicine I (General & Internal Medicine) 157 15.2




Agriculture & environment 36 3.5
Biology (Organismic & Supraorganismic level) 31 3.0
Biomedical research 26 2.5
Mathematics 26 2.5
Geosciences & space sciences 19 1.8
Neuroscience & behavior 13 1.3
Total 1034
￿ 100.0
￿ Two researchers had a tie in terms of their number of publications for two or more disciplines and are not shown.
Table 3: Research output (yearly averages)
Variable Mean
Publications per author 3.3
(5.1)
Coauthors per publication 4.7
(3.7)
Citations per publication 3.0
(4.2)




Number of researchers 1036
Standard deviations in brackets
29Table 4: Percentiles for publication output, by discipline (yearly averages)
Percentiles
Main discipline 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Agriculture and Environment 0.0 0.1 1.9 5.2 8.8
Biosciences 0.6 1.6 4.3 8.4 14.3
Chemistry 0.0 0.8 3.7 8.0 13.3
Engineering 0.0 0.0 1.2 3.0 5.6
Geosciences and Space Sciences 0.0 0.1 1.0 4.0 6.8
Mathematics 0.0 0.1 1.2 2.9 4.8
Clinical and Experimental Medicine I 0.0 1.4 4.0 7.1 12.1
Clinical and Experimental Medicine II 0.0 0.2 2.0 4.8 8.4
Neuroscience and Behavior 0.1 0.3 1.5 4.5 7.7
Physics 0.0 1.0 3.5 7.6 13.3
Biomedical Research 0.1 0.3 2.2 6.8 12.2
Biology 0.2 0.5 2.4 6.0 10.4
Average 0.1 0.5 2.4 5.7 9.8
Since a researcher￿ s main discipline can only be determined if she has any


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 6: Cross-sectional estimation results, publication data
Quantile regressions Zero-in￿ated
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% negative binomial
age 0.14** 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.01
(2.81) (0.11) (0.31) (0.79) (1.68) (0.17)
age squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00
(-3.30) (-0.47) (-0.86) (-1.57) (-2.51) (-0.47)
career age -0.03* -0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-1.69) (-1.65) (0.13) (0.37) (0.65) (0.11)
seniority in rank 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.64) (0.11) (-0.08) (0.31) (1.17) (-0.31)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 -1.18** -0.94** -0.75** -0.53** -0.38** -0.61**
(-10.12) (-14.03) (-5.42) (-5.31) (-7.30) (-5.97)
rank 2 in t-1 -0.73** -0.68** -0.59** -0.36** -0.23** -0.38**
(-2.94) (-7.28) (-5.94) (-12.98) (-11.06) (-5.08)
rank 3 in t-1 -0.33* -0.35** -0.37** -0.24** -0.12** -0.22**
(-1.84) (-2.77) (-3.66) (-6.77) (-9.65) (-3.30)
other rank in t-1 -0.78** -0.87** -0.69** -0.44** -0.26** -0.42**
(-7.19) (-7.02) (-11.68) (-6.19) (-6.99) (-5.15)
head of unit in t-1 0.51** 0.35** 0.17** 0.07 0.04 0.10**
(3.23) (3.50) (2.10) (1.35) (0.50) (2.02)
project funding
type I funding in t-1 1.14** 0.63** 0.26** 0.14** 0.03 0.17**
(10.69) (8.73) (4.02) (10.87) (0.73) (2.73)
type II funding in t-1 0.77** 0.56** 0.27** 0.22** 0.17** 0.12*
(9.08) (26.45) (22.09) (7.94) (15.16) (1.82)
nr of co-authors 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.02**
(3.17) (3.97) (9.51) (17.55) (23.12) (8.03)
teaching load -0.07** -0.03** -0.02** -0.01** -0.01** -0.03**
(-7.17) (-4.46) (-4.95) (-3.90) (-2.01) (-2.49)
male 0.91 0.57** 0.37** 0.24** 0.17** 0.21
(1.31) (3.17) (5.30) (14.75) (3.71) (1.56)
fulltime 1.28** 0.74** 0.88** 0.70** 0.57** 0.43**
(4.77) (7.70) (10.55) (8.31) (17.68) (3.20)
entry ￿ 1992 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14* -0.09 -0.02 -0.06
(-0.59) (-1.45) (-1.72) (-1.54) (-0.17) (-0.64)
year dummies included included
main discipline included included
faculty membership included included
Observations 7,062 7,062
t-statistics in parentheses. The parameters for the quantile regressions are based on 10
jittered samples, the standard errors are calculated using 380 clustered bootstrap samples
(clustering by by individual).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05
32Table 7: Panel-data estimation results, publication data
Quantile regressions Random e⁄ects
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% negative binomial1
age 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03** 0.08**
(1.64) (0.24) (0.37) (0.96) (2.62) (3.96)
age squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00**
(-2.16) (-0.62) (-0.76) (-1.57) (-4.06) (-6.07)
career age -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04**
(-0.68) (-1.61) (-0.39) (0.02) (0.88) (5.24)
seniority in rank -0.08** -0.05** -0.04** -0.02** -0.01 -0.01**
(-3.26) (-3.76) (-3.36) (-2.71) (-0.90) (-2.52)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 -0.78** -0.84** -0.61** -0.39** -0.21** -0.25**
(-6.22) (-5.46) (-4.23) (-3.12) (-3.43) (-4.35)
rank 2 in t-1 -0.28 -0.40** -0.45** -0.21** -0.09** -0.13**
(-1.23) (-3.64) (-12.25) (-3.44) (-5.80) (-2.81)
rank 3 in t-1 -0.02 -0.11 -0.20** -0.10 -0.01 -0.11**
(-0.17) (-1.49) (-5.45) (-1.32) (-1.27) (-2.66)
other rank in t-1 -0.59** -0.77** -0.57** -0.28** -0.13** -0.25**
(-5.13) (-10.91) (-6.16) (-2.17) (-3.42) (-4.55)
head of unit in t-1 0.48** 0.37** 0.21* 0.07* 0.08* 0.07**
(4.12) (4.12) (1.96) (1.93) (1.77) (2.15)
project funding
type I funding in t-1 0.76** 0.54** 0.20* 0.12** 0.03 0.09**
(6.20) (7.83) (1.80) (3.42) (0.61) (2.63)
type II funding in t-1 0.55** 0.39** 0.24** 0.18** 0.17** 0.09**
(11.77) (14.60) (8.58) (5.25) (7.53) (3.29)
nr of co-authors 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.00**
(2.13) (7.80) (13.66) (44.16) (20.06) (28.70)
teaching load -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01
(-1.36) (-1.34) (-1.01) (-2.43) (-4.33) (-1.64)
male 0.66 0.58** 0.34** 0.25** 0.18** 0.36**
(0.78) (3.50) (2.34) (15.21) (2.93) (3.41)
fulltime 1.27** 0.67** 0.81** 0.68** 0.61** 0.39**
(4.04) (11.80) (13.07) (6.75) (17.42) (5.69)
entry ￿ 1992 -0.30 -0.40** -0.21** -0.06 0.10 -0.17*
(-1.12) (-3.82) (-2.03) (-0.74) (0.76) (-1.76)
year dummies included included
main discipline included included
faculty membership included included
N 7,062 7,062
t-statistics in parentheses. The parameters for the quantile regressions are based on 10
jittered samples, the standard errors are calculated using 380 clustered bootstrap samples
(clustering by by individual).
1Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled negative binomial model: ￿2= 3,019.06











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 8: Panel-data estimation results, citation data
Quantile regressions Random e⁄ects
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% negative binomial1
age 0.11 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03
(1.57) (-0.95) (0.05) (-0.23) (-0.18) (1.16)
age squared -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00**
(-2.05) (0.38) (-0.62) (-0.30) (-0.63) (-2.72)
career age -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
(-0.24) (-0.96) (-1.03) (0.03) (0.30) (1.45)
seniority in rank -0.11** -0.09** -0.06** -0.04** -0.01 -0.00
(-2.62) (-3.74) (-2.46) (-20.79) (-1.03) (-0.10)
rank
rank 1 in t-1 -1.28** -1.11** -0.76** -0.37** -0.31** -0.56**
(-4.57) (-3.02) (-4.45) (-2.15) (-3.99) (-7.00)
rank 2 in t-1 -0.62** -0.62** -0.53** -0.29** -0.20** -0.36**
(-3.15) (-2.26) (-16.90) (-2.88) (-2.22) (-5.56)
rank 3 in t-1 -0.43** -0.06 -0.26* -0.23** -0.15** -0.22**
(-2.45) (-0.47) (-1.92) (-2.68) (-11.10) (-3.89)
other rank in t-1 -1.34** -1.23** -0.77** -0.47** -0.34** -0.53**
(-4.68) (-7.28) (-11.44) (-2.89) (-5.00) (-6.69)
head of unit in t-1 0.78** 0.67** 0.32** 0.14** 0.05 0.18**
(3.30) (4.22) (2.25) (3.51) (0.96) (3.98)
project funding
type I funding in t-1 1.20** 1.06** 0.64** 0.40** 0.30** 0.41**
(10.28) (5.22) (4.04) (3.08) (2.60) (7.58)
type II funding in t-1 0.50** 0.76** 0.54** 0.52** 0.45** 0.26**
(2.73) (4.41) (9.07) (13.30) (6.53) (6.16)
nr of co-authors 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 0.00**
(2.48) (8.31) (9.61) (20.90) (27.07) (26.39)
teaching load -0.07** -0.06** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02** -0.03**
(-2.64) (-2.25) (-1.02) (-1.22) (-3.03) (-4.19)
male 1.03 1.19** 0.76** 0.35** 0.18** 0.47**
(1.19) (4.29) (2.94) (2.83) (2.31) (5.77)
fulltime 1.20** 1.10** 1.15** 0.92** 0.55** 0.74**
(6.14) (9.59) (5.95) (13.78) (8.35) (9.02)
entry ￿ 1992 -0.36 -0.48** -0.17 -0.10 0.16** -0.25**
(-0.73) (-4.65) (-1.12) (-1.34) (2.96) (-3.55)
year dummies included included
main discipline included included
faculty membership included included
Observations 7,062 7,062
t-statistics in parentheses. The parameters for the quantile regressions are based on 10
jittered samples, the standard errors are calculated using 380 clustered bootstrap samples
(clustering by by individual).
1 Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled negative binomial model: ￿2= 1,381.49
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05
35Table 9: Test of equality of individual parameters across quantiles (chi-squared values)
Publications Citations
cross-section panel data cross-section panel data
age 7.64 5.36 21.43** 18.34**
age squared 11.59** 7.09 30.80** 26.50**
career age 43.37** 31.24** 40.29** 65.89**
seniority in rank 7.81* 113.67** 11.92** 103.25**
rank
rank 1 in t-1 223.19** 32.45** 233.37** 116.60**
rank 2 in t-1 80.96** 204.38** 43.59** 45.53**
rank 3 in t-1 22.76** 93.50** 21.48** 12.39**
other rank in t-1 75.82** 97.69** 419.91** 228.51**
head of unit in t-1 409.46** 115.70** 211.04** 94.35**
project funding
type I funding in t-1 488.44** 488.54** 741.94** 250.83**
type II funding in t-1 244.39** 136.41** 43.31** 17.71**
nr of co-authors 1,267.21** 96.18** 1,742.02** 117.95**
teaching load 69.02** 4.19 31.28** 35.09**
male 24.48** 86.68** 135.72** 118.56**
fulltime 17.64** 27.20** 179.55** 390.31**
entry ￿ 1992 5.18 123.02** 28.57** 173.39**
The variance-covariance matrix is calculated using bootstrapping. For the publication panel-
data results, 2 out of 380 bootstraps were dropped due to outliers; for the other models 1
out of 380 bootstraps was dropped.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05
36